This paper concerns a (prospective) goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, the procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.
shall, however, do my utmost to offer the reader a good idea of the functioning of adaptive logics.
An especially important feature of adaptive logics is their dynamic proof theory. This proof theory is intended for explicating actual reasoning-see [34] for a historical example-a task that cannot be accomplished by definitions, semantic systems, and other more abstract characterizations.
The dynamics of the proof theory results from the absence of a positive test. More often than not, the dynamics is double. The external dynamics is well known: as new premises become available, consequences derived from the earlier premise set may be withdrawn. In other words, the external dynamics results from the non-monotonic character of the consequence relation-the fact that, for some Γ, ∆ and A, Γ A but Γ ∪ ∆ A. The internal dynamics is very different from the external one. Even if the premise set is constant, certain formulas are considered as derived at some stage of the proof, but are considered as not derived at a later stage. For any consequence relation, insight into the premises is only gained by deriving consequences from them. In the absence of a positive test, this results in the internal dynamics. The external dynamics always entails an internal dynamics. The converse, however, does not hold. The Weak consequence relation from [44] and [45] -see [23] and [24] for an extensive study of such consequence relations-is monotonic. Nevertheless, its proof theory necessarily displays an internal dynamics because there is no positive test for it. Also, some logics for which there is a positive test, may nevertheless be characterized in a nice way in terms of a dynamic proof theorysee [15] on the pure calculus of the R-implication from [2] .
Dynamic proofs differ in two main respects from usual proofs. The first difference concerns annotated versions. Apart from (i) a line number, (ii) a formula, (iii) the line numbers of the formulas from which the formula is derived, and (iv) the rule by which the formula is derived (the latter two are the justification of the line), dynamic proofs also contain (v) a condition. Intuitively, this is a set of formulas that are supposed to be false, or, to be more precise, formulas the truth of which is not required by the premises.
The second main difference is that, apart from the deduction rules that allow one to add lines to the proof, there is a marking definition. The underlying idea is as follows. As the proof proceeds, more formulas are derived from the premises. In view of these formulas, some conditions may turn out not to hold. The lines at which such conditions occur are marked. Formulas derived at marked lines are taken not to be derived from the premises. In other words, they are considered as 'out'. One way to understand the procedure is as follows. As the proof proceeds, one's insight into the premises improves. More particularly, some of the conditions that were introduced earlier may turn out not to hold.
For any stage of the proof, the marking definition settles which lines are marked and which lines are unmarked. This leads to a precise definition of derivability at a stage. Notwithstanding the precise character of this notion, we also want a more stable form of derivability, which is called final derivability. The latter does not depend on the stage of the proof; nor does it depend on the way in which a specific proof from a set of premises proceeds. It is an abstract and stable relation between a set of premises and a conclusion. A different way for putting this is that final derivability refers to a stage of the proof at which the mark (or its absence) of a line has become stable. Final derivability should be sound and strongly complete with respect to the semantics. For any adaptive logic AL, A should be finally derivable from Γ (Γ AL A) if and only if A is a semantic consequence of Γ (Γ AL A).
Consider a dynamic proof from a set of premises. At any point in time, the proof will be finite. It will reveal what is derivable from the premises at that stage of the proof. But obviously we are interested in final derivability. Whence the question: what does a proof at a stage reveal about final derivability? As there is no positive test for the consequence relation, there is no algorithm for final derivability. So, there are at best certain criteria to decide, for specific A and Γ, whether A is finally derivable from Γ.
What if no criterion enables one to conclude from the proof whether certain formulas are or are not finally derivable from the premise set? The answer or rather the answers to this question are presented in [10] . Roughly, they go as follows. First, there is a characteristic semantics for derivability at a stage. Next, it can be shown that, as the dynamic proof proceeds, the insight into the premises provided by the proof never decreases and may increase. 3 In other words, derivability at a stage provides an estimate for final derivability, and, as the proof proceeds, this estimate may become better, and never becomes worse. In view of all this, derivability at a stage gives one exactly what one might expect, viz. a fallible but sensible estimate of final derivability. 4 At any stage of the proof, one has to decide (obviously on the basis of pragmatic considerations) whether one will continue the proof or rely on present insights.
Needless to say, one should apply a criterion for final derivability whenever one can. This motivated the search for such criteria-see [10] , [19] and [20] . Unfortunately, most of these criteria are complex and only transparent for people that are well acquainted with dynamic proofs. Recently, it turned out that a specific kind of goal directed proof offers a way out in this respect. The idea is not to formulate a criterion, but rather to specify a specific proof procedure that functions as a criterion. The proof procedure is applied to Γ AL A. Whenever the proof procedure stops, it is possible to conclude from the resulting proof whether or not Γ AL A. Preparatory work on the propositional fragment of CL (classical logic) is presented in [21] and some first results on the proof procedure for inconsistency-adaptive logics are presented in this paper.
The present paper is restricted to the propositional level. So, all references to logical systems concern the propositional fragments only. At this level the proof procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability: if the proof procedure is applied to A 1 , . . . , A n B, it always terminates after finitely many steps-see Theorem 4 . If, at the last stage of the proof, B is derived at an unmarked line, then B is finally derivable from A 1 , . . . , A n ; if B is not derived at an unmarked line, it is not finally derivable from A 1 , . . . , A n . However, the proof procedure may be extended to the predicative level and there provides a criterion for final derivability if it terminates. The main interest of the procedure lies there.
The results presented in subsequent sections are not only interesting because they form an important tool for adaptive logics. It has been shown for a number of logics and logical mechanisms that they are characterized by an adaptive logic. Moreover, this characterization led for several systems to an interesting strengthening or variant. Among the finished results are [14] , [18] , [22] and [50] for the consequence relations from [45] , [23] and [24] ; [36] and [35] for [51] ; [40] for [1] and other logic based approaches to abduction (see [43] ); [39] for the notion of empirical progress from [31] ; [37] for [41] and [28] ; [30] and [9] for default reasoning and circumscription respectively (see [3] , [27] and [33] ); [49] and [48] for prioritized consequence relations. Work in progress concerns default reasoning and the signed systems from [25] . For all logics and logical mechanisms that can be characterized by an adaptive logic in standard format, the results of the present paper can be extended in such a way that those logics and logical mechanisms are provided, next to a semantics and a provably sound syntactic characterization, with criteria for (final) derivability (and with a decision method at the propositional level).
In Section 2, I briefly present the inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN1 and its dynamic proof theory. In Section 3, the goal-directed proof procedure is applied to CL. This will make the matter easily understood by everyone. The proof procedure for the adaptive logic ACLuN1 is spelled out in Section 4.
The Inconsistency-Adaptive Logic ACLuN1
The central difference between paraconsistent logics and inconsistency-adaptive logics can easily be described in proof theoretic terms. In a (monotonic) paraconsistent logic some deduction rules of CL are invalid; in an inconsistencyadaptive logic, some applications of deduction rules of CL are invalid.
The original application context that led to inconsistency-adaptive logicssee [8] -is still one of the most clarifying ones. Suppose that a theory T was intended as consistent and was formulated with CL as its underlying logic. Suppose next that T turns out to be inconsistent. Of course, one will want to replace T by some consistent improvement T . Typically, one does not just throw away T , restarting from scratch. One reasons from T in order to locate the inconsistency or inconsistencies and in order to locate constraints for the replacement T . Needless to say, logic alone is not sufficient to find the justified replacement T . 5 However, logic is able to locate the inconsistencies in T . It can provide one with an interpretation of T that is 'as consistent as possible'. Let me phrase this in intuitive terms. At points where T is inconsistent, some deduction rules of CL cannot apply-if they did, the resulting interpretation of T would be trivial in that it would make every sentence of the language a theorem of T . But where T is consistent, all deduction rules of CL should apply.
An extremely simple propositional example will clarify the matter. Consider the theory T that is characterized by the premise set {p, ∼p ∨ r, q, ∼q ∨ s, ∼p}. From these premises, r should not be derived by Disjunctive Syllogism. Indeed, ∼p ∨ r is just an obvious weakening of ∼p. If one were to derive r from the premises, then, by the same reasoning, one should derive ∼r from p and ∼p ∨ ∼r, which also is an obvious weakening of ∼p. However, if one interprets the premises as consistently as possible, one should derive s from them, viz. by Disjunctive Syllogism from q and ∼q ∨ s. Indeed, while the premises require p to behave inconsistently (require p ∧ ∼p to be true), they do not require q to behave inconsistently (they do not require q ∧ ∼q to be true).
As the matter is central, let me phrase it differently. The theory T from the previous paragraph turns out to be inconsistent. As it was intended to be consistent, it should be interpreted as consistently as possible. Given that T is inconsistent, one will move 'down' to a paraconsistent logic-a logic that allows for inconsistencies. If a formula turns out to be inconsistent on the paraconsistent reading of T , one cannot apply certain rules of CL to it. Thus, even on the paraconsistent interpretation of T , p ∧ ∼p is true. But consider p ∧ (∼p ∨ r). Given the meaning of conjunction and disjunction, this formula entails (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ r. According to CL, p ∧ ∼p cannot be true, and hence r is true. However, the premises state that p ∧ ∼p is true. So, if one wants to reason sensibly from these premises, one cannot rely on the CL-presupposition that p ∧ ∼p is bound to be false. However, where the paraconsistent reading of T does not require that a specific formula A behaves inconsistently, one may retain the CL-presupposition that A is consistent, and hence apply CL-rules where they are validated by this presupposition. Thus T affirms q ∧ (∼q ∨ s), which entails (q ∧ ∼q) ∨ s. As T does not require q ∧ ∼q to be true, it should be taken to be false and one should conclude to s.
The intuitive statements from the two preceding paragraphs are given a precise and coherent formulation by inconsistency-adaptive logics.
An adaptive logic is characterized by the following triple:
(ii) a set of abnormalities (characterized by a logical form), 7 and (iii) an adaptive strategy (specifying the meaning of "interpreting the premises as normally as possible"). Extending the lower limit logic with the requirement that no abnormality is logically possible results in a monotonic logic, which is called the upper limit logic.
Let me illustrate this by the specific inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN1. In this paper, I shall only consider the propositional level of the logic and I shall consider no other strategy than Reliability.
The lower limit logic of ACLuN1 is CLuN. This monotonic paraconsistent logic is just like CL, except in that it allows for gluts with respect to negationwhence the name CLuN. Axiomatically, CLuN is obtained by extending full positive propositional logic with the axiom schema A ∨ ∼A-see [11] for a study of the full logics CLuN and ACLuN1, including the semantics. CLuN isolates inconsistencies. Indeed, Double Negation, de Morgan rules, and all similar negation reducing rules are not validated by CLuN. As a result, complex contradictions do not reduce to truth functions of simpler contradictions.
8 There 6 In this paper I consider only flat adaptive logics. Other adaptive logics are the prioritized ones, which are defined as specific combinations of flat adaptive logics-see [16] . 7 In my view, it is philosophically important that all formulas of a certain logical form are abnormalities, and hence are taken to be false until and unless proven otherwise. Some flat adaptive logics are described and studied as formula-preferential systems in [32] -see also- [4] . Ω is then any set of formulas. It is not clear whether this may be generalized to all adaptive logics, but, by a somewhat nasty trick, all formula-preferential systems can be shown to be characterized by an adaptive logic.
are several versions of CLuN. In this paper I consider a version for which classical negation is present in the language-I shall discuss this convention below.
The set of abnormalities, Ω, comprises all formulas of the form A ∧ ∼A. Extending CLuN with the axiom schema (A ∧ ∼A) ⊃ B results in the upper limit logic, which is CL.
Finally, we come to the adaptive strategy. Below I shall often need to refer to disjunctions of abnormalities, which I shall call Dab-formulas. From now on an expression of the form Dab(∆) will refer to a disjunction of abnormalities; in other words, Dab(∆) is the disjunction of the members of ∆, which is a finite subset of Ω.
9 Dab(∆) will be called a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff Γ CLuN Dab(∆) and there is no ∆ ⊂ ∆ for which Γ CLuN Dab(∆ ). If Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ and ∆ is not a singleton, the premises require some member of ∆ to be true, but do not specify which member is true. In view of this possibility, one needs to introduce an adaptive strategy. One wants to interpret the premises "as normally as possible" (which for the present Ω means "as consistently as possible"), but this phrase is ambiguous. As indicated in (iii), an adaptive strategy disambiguates the phrase.
The Reliability strategy from [8] 10 is the oldest known strategy, and the one that is simplest from a proof theoretic point of view. I shall not consider any other strategies in this paper. Let U (Γ) = {A | A ∈ ∆ for some minimal Dabconsequence Dab(∆) of Γ} be the set of formulas that are unreliable with respect to Γ. Below, I shall define Γ ACLuN1 A, which will be read as "A is finally ACLuN1-derivable from Γ". The following Theorem, proved as Theorem 4.3 of [11] , says in plain words that A is ACLuN1-derivable from Γ iff there is a ∆ such that A ∨ Dab(∆) is CLuN-derivable from Γ and no member of ∆ is unreliable with respect to Γ.
The dynamic proof theory of any (flat) adaptive logic is characterized by three (generic) rules, except of course that the rules RU and RC should refer to the right lower limit logic. Let Γ be the set of premises as before. I now list the official deduction rules.
11 Immediately thereafter I shall mention a shorthand notation that most people will find more transparent.
PREM If A ∈ Γ, one may add a line comprising the following elements: 
Where "A ∆ " abbreviates that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆, the rules may be phrased more transparently as follows:
While the deduction rules enable one to add lines to the proof, the marking definition, which depends on the strategy, determines which lines are "in" and which lines are "out". For the Reliability strategy, we first need to define the set U s (Γ) of formulas that are unreliable at a stage s of a proof. Let Dab(∆) be a minimal Dab-formula at stage s of the proof iff, at that stage, Dab(∆) has been derived on the condition ∅ and there is no ∆ ⊂ ∆ for which Dab(∆ ) has been derived on the condition ∅. 12 Let U s (Γ) = df {A | A ∈ ∆ for some minimal Dab-formula Dab(∆) at stage s of the proof }.
Definition 1 Where ∆ is the condition of line i, line i is marked at stage s iff ∆ ∩ U s (Γ) = ∅. (Marking definition for Reliability)
Lines that are unmarked at one stage may be marked at the next, and vice versa. Finally, I list the definitions that concern final derivability-the definitions are identical for all adaptive logics.
Definition 2 A is finally derived from Γ at line i of a proof at stage s iff A is derived at line i, line i is not marked at stage s, and any extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.
Definition 3 Γ ACLuN1 A (A is finally ACLuN1-derivable from Γ) iff A is finally derived at a line of a proof from Γ.
Remark that by "a proof" I mean (here and elsewhere) a sequence of lines that is obtained by applying certain instructions. In the present context, this means that each line in the sequence is obtained by applying a deduction rule and that the marking definition was applied. Here is a very simple dynamic proof.
Up to stage 7 of the proof, all lines are unmarked. At stage 8, lines 6 and 7 are marked because U 8 (Γ) = {p ∧ ∼p, q ∧ ∼q}. At stage 9, only line 6 is marked because U 9 (Γ) = {p ∧ ∼p}. It is easily seen that, if 1-5 are the only premises, then the marks will remain unchanged in all extensions of the proof. So, r is not a final consequence of Γ whereas s is a final consequence of Γ.
The convention on classical negation. As promised, I now discuss the convention that the language contains classical negation, which will be written as "¬" (or that the language contains ⊥ together with ¬A = df A ⊃ ⊥). In a sense then, CLuN is an extension of CL. It has the full inferential power of CL, ¬ functioning as the CL-negation, and moreover contains the paraconsistent negation ∼. In the original application context, mentioned in the second paragraph of this section, the premises belong to the ¬-free (and ⊥-free) fragment of the language. Of course different application contexts are possible, but even in the original application context the presence of ¬ is useful: it greatly simplifies metatheoretic proofs and technical matters in general, and in no way hampers the limitations imposed by the application context. 13 As will appear in Section 4, the presence of ¬ also greatly simplifies the prospective procedure that will serve as a criterion for final derivability.
Prospective Proofs for Classical Logic
In this section I merely present an example: a prospective proof for p
14 As the proof is simple, I skip the rules as well as the heuristic instructions-these are spelled out in [21] -and merely offer some comments.
The first step introduces the main goal:
This step, which expresses the truism that ¬p can be obtained on the condition that ¬p can be obtained, is meant to remind one that one is looking for the formula that occurs in the condition, viz. ¬p. The purpose served by a condition in prospective proofs is very different from the one in dynamic proofs-it is 'prospective' rather than 'defeasible'. In view of the condition of line 1, one introduces a premise from which ¬p may be obtained, and next analyses the premise:
The prospective condition for 2 is empty for obvious reasons, and I shall write such conditions invisibly. Line 3 illustrates a formula analysing rule: in view of 2, one would have ¬p if one had ¬(q ∧ s). As ¬(q ∧ s) cannot be obtained by analysing a premise, one applies a condition analysing rule to ¬(q ∧ s):
The following steps require no comment:
As the main goal is obtained on the empty condition at line 7, the proof is completed.
It is easily seen that, in a proof for Γ CL A, a formula B is derivable on the condition ∆-with some notational abuse:
Some lines are marked in goal-directed proofs for CL. Unlike what was the case in the previous section, these marks indicate that one should not try to derive the members of the condition of marked lines. More details are presented in the next section, where these marks will be called D-marks because they relate to derivability-A-marks will relate to the adaptive character of the logic.
Prospective Proofs for ACLuN1
Prospective proofs for ACLuN1 have lines that contain two conditions:
A will be called the formula of the line. The prospective condition, ∆, is called the D-condition. As in prospective proofs for CL, it contains the formulas that one needs to derive in order to obtain A. The adaptive condition, Θ, will be called the A-condition. It contains the abnormalities that should not belong to U (Γ) in order for A to be derivable from the premises. The occurrence of the above line i in an ACLuN1-proof from Γ warrants that Γ ∪ ∆ CLuN A ∨ Dab(Θ)-see Theorem 5. In order to show that Γ ACLuN1 G one needs a line like the displayed one at which A = G, ∆ = ∅, and Θ ∩ U (Γ) = ∅.
To facilitate the exposition, I shall write [∆] A Θ to denote that A has been derived on the D-condition ∆ and on the A-condition Θ, and I shall write A Θ when ∆ is known to be empty. Before describing the procedure, I shall present the rules and some required definitions. Let * A denote the 'complement' of A, viz. B if A is ¬B and ¬A otherwise.
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The following rules introduce premises or start new phases or subphases of the proof. A-Goal and X-Goal are identical but are used in different contexts.
Prem
If
We have seen that CLuN contains all of CL. The formula analysing rules and the condition analysing rules for CL may be summarized by distinguishing a-formulas from b-formulas (varying on a theme from [47] ). To each formula two other formulas are assigned according to the following table:
The formula analysing rules for a-formulas and b-formulas are respectively:
For ACLuN1 we moreover need:
The rule ∼E expresses that ∼A entails ¬A on the condition that A ∧ ∼A is false (because then A is false and hence ¬A is true). ¬∼E states that A is true whenever ∼A is false; the converse obviously does not hold. The condition analysing rules for a-formulas and b-formulas are respectively:
Sometimes a double complement will be needed. Remark that * * ¬p is ¬p but that * * ¬¬p is p, just like * * p. 16 The rule to the left actually summarizes two rules: both [∆] a 1 Θ and [∆] a 2 Θ may be derived from [∆] a Θ ; similarly for the rule to the right and for the condition analysing rule to the right below.
For C∼E: if one can obtain ¬A, then one can obtain ∼A; for C¬∼E: if one can obtain B, and B ∧ ∼B is reliable, then one can obtain ¬∼B.
To obtain a complete system one needs Trans and EM. Moreover, the derivable rule EM0 and the permissible rule IC simplify the proof procedure.
That A is a positive part of another formula is recursively defined by the following clauses: 
pp(A, ¬∼A).
3. pp( * A, ∼A). 
If pp(A, B) and pp(B, C), then pp(A, C).
A-marking (marking in view of the A-conditions, providing from the adaptive character of the logic) is taken over by the procedure below. D-marking (marking in view of D-conditions) is governed by the following definition. If 1 is the case, the condition is circular; if 2 is the case, some (set theoretically) weaker condition is sufficient to obtain A. In the other two cases, line i indicates a search path that can only be successful if the premises are ¬-inconsistent. Although it is not necessary to mark such search paths, it turns out more efficient to postpone them to phase 1B-see below.
The procedure. Several variants are possible. To save some space I describe a variant that leaves much choice to the person who constructs the proof and hence may lead to rather inefficient proofs, but nevertheless warrants that all steps are sensible with respect to the aim. I shall disregard infinite Γ.
A prospective ACLuN1-proof for A 1 , . . . , A n G will consist of three phases. In the first phase, one tries to obtain G Θ for some Θ. If this succeeds and Θ = ∅, one moves to phase 2 and tries to obtain Dab(Θ) Λ for some Λ. If this succeeds and Λ = ∅, one moves on to phase 3 and tries to obtain Dab(Λ) ∅ . If a phase terminates, one returns to the previous one. In phase 1, there are two subphases: phase 1 starts with subphase 1A, and only if no other step is possible one applies EFQ, which starts subphase 1B.
Each phase starts by applying a goal rule. In a phase, the members of the D-conditions of unmarked lines of the phase are called the targets. The following restrictions are important. Premises are introduced and formulas analysed iff a target is a positive part of the formula of the added line. Condition analysing rules are only applied to targets. A formula analysing rule is never applied to a formula that does not have a premise in its path-analysing a goal is provably a useless complication. Once [∆] A Θ occurs in the proof, one never adds another line with that same formula, D-condition and A-condition (even if the justification of the line is different). Finally, EFQ is only applied in subphase 1B. 18 The restrictions are important because they define when the procedure terminates (in a phase)-as suggested before, introducing more restrictions may lead to more efficient proofs.
Let us consider the three phases and the conclusions that may be drawn from them. During phases 2 and 3, a line may be A-marked (marked in view of its A-condition). A phase terminates if no lines can be added in view of current targets. Some fine tuning. Before moving to some examples, I shall present some comments that concern the procedure as well as some comments that pertain to the efficiency of the proofs.
EFQ is never applied in phase 2 or 3. This is justified by the following consideration. EFQ can only be successfully applied in a proof for Γ G if Γ is ¬-inconsistent. In that case, G ∅ is derivable from the premises and will be derived in phase 1B. Deriving any Dab-formula from Γ by applying EFQ (possibly combined with other rules) is a useless detour.
Moreover, EFQ is only applied in phase 1 at points where no other rule can be applied and, from that point on-that is, in subphase 1B-one adds only lines with an empty A-condition to the proof, and hence never moves on to phase 2. The reason for this is obvious: if the main goal can only be obtained by EFQ, then it is derivable by the lower limit logic, viz. CLuN, and hence there is no point in deriving it on some A-condition.
I now describe an apparently rather efficient variant of the procedure; it is nearly identical for the three phases. Let me start with some general instructions. No line is added to the proof if it would at once be marked. At each stage, one first tries to apply EM0, EM and Trans provided this leads to a line being marked. IC is applied whenever possible.
If this does not lead to the aim of the phase, one proceeds in a strictly goal directed way. More particularly, one considers the first formula in the last unmarked condition (of the current phase) as the sole target. If the target cannot be obtained from the premises, then obtaining the other members of the same condition is useless anyway. If no step is possible in view of the targetthis means that the target is a dead end-one considers the first formula in the next-to-last unmarked condition of the current phase as the target, and so on.
If it is possible to act in view of the target, one applies the rules in the following order-remember what was said about positive parts. First, one tries to apply a formula analysing rule to a formula that occurs at an unmarked line. Next, one tries to introduce a premise. If all this does not enable one to derive the target and eliminate it from the D-condition by transitivity, one applies a condition analysing rule to the target.
If the goal of the current phase cannot be obtained by strictly goal directed moves (the ones described above), all members of conditions of unmarked lines of the current phase are considered as targets, and one applies all rules, including Trans and EM, whenever this enables one to obtain the goal (of the current phase) on a new condition. One returns to strictly goal directed moves as soon as possible.
Only if all this fails, and the current phase is phase 1, one applies EFQ and, as said before, from there on only adds lines with an empty A-condition.
Some examples. Let us start with two simple examples. Consider first a prospective proof for ∼p ∨ r, p ∧ ∼q, q ACLuN1 r : The proof is successful: at line 7 r is derived on the empty D-condition and on the A-condition {p ∧ ∼p}, whence line 4 is D-marked. In phase 2 p ∧ ∼p turns out not to be derivable on any A-condition. So line 7 is unmarked and ∼p∨r, p∧∼q, q ACLuN1 r. Incidently, the premise set is ∼-consistent, in which case no line is ever A-marked. Next, consider a prospective proof for ∼p, p ∨ q, p ACLuN1 q : Here phase 3 stops. Line 16 is not A-marked and the procedure returns to phase 2; there line 6 is A-marked and the procedure returns to phase 1. There the procedure will continue, aiming at deriving s Θ in phase 1 for some Θ {p∧∼p}, but this will fail (and is bound to fail as the only open road is by EFQ whereas the premises are ¬-consistent). So p, ∼p ∨ s, r ⊃ t, ∼p ∨ q, ∼q ACLuN1 s A computer program that implements the procedure can be downloaded from http://logica.ugent.be/dirk/-the above proofs are produced by it. The data file that goes with the program contains a set of instructive example exercises.
Metatheoretic matters. The procedure is an algorithm for Γ ACLuN1 A as it is discussed here, viz. at the propositional level and for finite Γ.
In order to facilitate the proof of some lemma's, I now mention the CLuNsemantics. 20 Let S be the set of sentential letters, W the set of formulas, and N the set of formulas of the form ∼A. The semantics proceeds in terms of an assignment, v : S ∪ N → {0, 1}, and a valuation, v M : W → {0, 1}, determined by a model M = v . The valuation is defined as follows:
M is a model of Γ iff it verifies all members of Γ. A is valid iff all models verify A. Γ CLuN A iff all models of Γ verify A. The semantics is obviously equivalent to a more standard one (not mentioning a and b. That CLuN is sound and complete with respect to the semantics is proved in [11] (for the predicative version, and without ¬, which however is easily modified).
Remember that prospective proofs for CLuN are defined by the rules for ACLuN1 save ∼E, C¬∼E, IC, A-Goal and X-Goal-these modify the Acondition, or rely on it, whereas there is no A-condition in prospective proofs for CLuN. So prospective proofs for CLuN are defined by the rules for CL plus ¬∼E and C∼E (but without the A-condition). The proof of Theorem 2 is a simpler variant of that for Theorem 4 below. 
Corollary 1 The prospective proof procedure for CLuN is a decision method for CLuN-derivability.
The proof of Theorem 3 requires five pages, but is nearly identical to the corresponding proof for CL, which is available in [21, pp. 126-131] . The only changes to that proof concern those for accommodating ¬∼E and C∼E, and the changes are completely obvious. The difficult bit is obviously with the second statement in the theorem. This requires a ticking-off method as well as a demonstration that a model of Γ that falsifies G may be constructed from the set of lines of the form [∆] G that are neither marked nor ticked off. Central to that demonstration is that, if the proof is terminated without G being derived, then some CLuN-model falsifies a member of every such ∆ and falsifies G, and every such model is a model of Γ. The proof method is new and deserves being republished, but I need the allowed space for the rest of the metatheory.
Lemma 1 pp(A, B) iff pp( * A, * B).
Proof. The left-right direction is proved by an induction on the length of the recursion. For the basis, we have to consider the cases where pp (A, B) C such that pp(A, C) and pp(C, B) ; by the induction hypothesis pp( * A, * C) and pp( * C, * B) and hence pp( * A, * B) by clause 6.
The proof of the right-left direction is similar.
Let us extend the positive part function as follows: pp(A, Γ) iff pp(A, B) for some B ∈ Γ.
Proof. By an induction on the length of the prospective proof. The basis is formed by an application of the rules Goal, A-Goal or X-Goal, leading to [G ] G . Obviously A is G and pp( * B i , * G ). For the induction step, I only consider a few cases.
Rule Prem: pp(A, Γ).
Rule EFQ: A is G and pp( * B, Γ).
Formula analysing rules for a-formulas: where the rule is applied to a formula A , pp(A , Γ) by the induction hypothesis and the restriction (see the heading "The procedure") that a formula analysing rule can only be applied to an A that has a premise in its path. As A is a 1 or a 2 , and pp(a, Γ) by the induction hypothesis, pp(A, a), and hence pp(A, Γ). The other cases are left to the reader. In view of on Lemma 2, each of the following holds true:
21 So G is either G or the Dab-formula introduced by A-Goal or the Dab-formula introduced by X-Goal. 22 Condition analysing rules: pp( * a 1 , * a) in view of Lemma 1 and pp(a 1 , a).
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Theorem 5 If [∆] A
Θ is derived at a line in a prospective proof from Γ, then
Proof. By an obvious induction on the length of the prospective proof. Basis: an application of the Goal rule is justified by Γ ∪ {G} CLuN G. For the induction step, every rule has to be considered. I consider only one case as an example.
Case ∼E. Suppose that [∆] ∼A Θ occurs in the proof. By the induction hypothesis
which holds iff
which justifies that [∆] ¬A Θ∪{A∧∼A} is added to the prospective proof.
In proof of the following lemma, we need the depth at which a subformula A of B is nested in B. Let † be a variable for ¬ and ∼ and let be a variable for the binary connectives. The function d(A, B) is defined by the following clauses: 
Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true. I shall prove ( * ) by an induction on the depth of ∼A in B. From ( pp(∼A, B) nor pp(¬∼A, B) . a 1 ), then pp(∼A, a 1 ) by the induction hypothesis, and hence pp (∼A, B) ;
The proof of cases 2-4 is analogous to that of case 1: case 2: B is an a- Proof. Suppose that the antecedent is true, that A ∧ ∼A ∈ ∆, and that pp(∼A, Γ) is false.
Let
As Γ ACLuN1 Dab(∆ ) for every ∆ ⊂ ∆, there is a CLuN-model of Γ that verifies A ∧ ∼A and falsifies every B i ∧ ∼B i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). More precisely, let M = v be such a model for which v(∼B i ) = 0 for every B i . There obviously is such a model:
M is a model of Γ that falsifies Dab(∆), which contradicts the main supposition.
As the proof of the theorem requires many pages, I can only present an outline. There are some provable things for which I offer no demonstration, for example, that the order in which certain rules are applied has no effect on whether the goal is derivable in the proof. I start by outlining the proof of the following lemma: I now outline the proof of the theorem. Let a line i of a prospective proof be a descendant of a line j iff i is j or j belongs to the path of i.
Suppose that the antecedent of Theorem 7 is true. Let X abbreviate G ∨ (A 1 ∧∼A 1 )∨. . .∨(A n ∧∼A n ). The supposition entails that Γ is ¬-consistent-it it were not, Γ CLuN G would obtain, which contradicts the supposition. So we can safely disregard EFQ in what follows.
The first line in the CLuN-proof for Γ CLuN X contains the following formula-with-condition:
[X] X .
In view of the presupposition, the thus started proof is bound to end with a line at which X is derived.
Let us neglect what was said under the heading "Some fine tuning" and apply the procedure in its crude (more permissive) form. This enables us to apply C∨E to the condition of (1) and to the condition of the resulting lines until we obtain a proof that contains n + 1 lines on which are derived:
Let these lines be called the basic lines of proof, and let the present stage of the proof be called the divorced stage.
Fact 1 X can be derived in such a way that every descendant of a line of the divorced stage is a descendant of a basic line.
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In other words, X, which can be derived in the proof, can be derived from the basic lines. To see this, suppose that, due to the precise location of the parentheses in X, To see this, remark that EM and Trans are the only rules that have two 'premises'. As these rules do not introduce any new conditions, their results cannot lead to further applications of Prem, of formula analysing rules, or of condition analysing rules.
Let us extend the isolationist stage with applications of EM and Trans until X is derived in the proof. This stage of the proof will be called the final stage. Fact 5 The line at which X is derived at the final stage is a descendant of every basic line.
Indeed, if this line was only a descendant of some basic lines, then the disjunction of the conditions of those lines would be CLuN-derivable from Γ, which contradicts the main supposition.
Of course not all resolution lines are required to obtain X by applications of Trans and EM at the final stage. Let a sufficient selection of resolution lines be a set of resolution lines that is sufficient to obtain X by EM and Trans. In view of Fact 5: Fact 6 Every selection of resolution lines that is sufficient to obtain X contains a descendant of each basic line.
Fact 7 X can be derived from the resolution lines by applications of EM alone.
Consider a sufficient selection of resolution lines and suppose that Trans can be applied to [∆ Let the following formulas 
As (2) occurs in the CLuN-proof,
can be derived in the ACLuN1-proof in view of fact 10. Both case 1 and case 2 lead to a similar situation. In the CLuN-proof we eliminated a resolution line, and hence at most all resolution lines that are descendants of a specific basic line, in the example [A j ∧ ∼A j ] X, and this led to (4) . That this can be done in the CLuN-proof warrants that, in the ACLuN1-proof, (10) can be obtained and its A-condition contains the abnormality that occurred in the D-condition of that basic line, in the example A j ∧ ∼A j .
Moreover we arrived at a new 'clean sufficient selection', in which (10) replaces (2) and (3). In this selection, (10) which contradicts the main supposition. So this ends the outline of the proof of the Theorem 7.
Theorem 8 For all finite Γ and for all G, the procedure forms a decision method for Γ ACLuN1 G.
Proof. In view of Theorem 4, every started phase terminates, and the procedure terminates. So I only have to show that the conclusions drawn during the different phases of the procedure are correct. Let us proceed backwards. Phase 3. For some Θ, G Θ was derived at line i in phase 1, for some Λ,
Dab(Θ)
Λ was derived at line j in phase 2, [Dab(Λ)] Dab(Λ) ∅ was introduced by X-Goal, and one tries to obtain Dab(Λ)
∅ . In view of Theorem 7, Dab(Λ) ∅ will be derived iff it is derivable.
26 There were two possibilities: (3.1) Dab(Λ) ∅ is derived. It follows that Γ CLuN Dab(Λ) and hence that Λ ∩ U (Γ) = ∅, whence line j is justly A-marked. Subphase 1B. One tries to derive G ∅ by applications of EFQ as well as well of the other CLuN-rules. In view of Theorem 3, if Γ is inconsistent, then G ∅ is derived iff Γ ACLuN1 G.
In Conclusion
The 'defeasible' conditions that occur in dynamic proofs of adaptive logics suggested a kind of dynamic proofs with 'prospective' conditions. This led to a specific form of goal directed proofs. Later, these goal directed proofs turned out to provide a proof procedure that forms an algorithm for final derivability at the propositional level. As remarked in Section 1, the central interest of the procedure is that it provides a criterion at the predicative level if it stops.
The dynamic proofs explicate actual reasoning. The prospective proofs do not, but there is an algorithm for turning them into standard dynamic proofs (by reordering and replacing lines). So, after finding out that some formula is derivable at a stage from the premises, one may switch to the goal directed format in order to find out whether the formula is finally derivable. If a decision is reached, one may transform the result to a regular dynamic proof, if desired. After this, the proof may proceed and, if a further interesting formula is derived at a stage, one may again switch to the goal directed format to settle its final derivability.
Given the present standard characterization (from [16] ) of flat adaptive logics, some minimal changes to the aforementioned rules will result in a prospective procedure for any other adaptive logic. Basically, one replaces the rules that pertain to the abnormalities-in the case of ACLuN1, the rules containing the paraconsistent negation ∼.
While these replacements are straightforward, further research is required for the predicative level. Devising sensible rules is unproblematic-the relevant research was finished. However, more work is needed to improve the efficiency of the procedure and to avoid infinite loops whenever possible. It is easily seen that known techniques from tableau methods and resolution methods may easily be transposed to avoid infinite loops in prospective proofs. 
